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Abstract
Attacks on computers are increasingly sophisticated, automated and damaging. We take inspiration from the diversity
and adaptation of the immune system to design a new kind of computer security system utilizing automated repair
techniques. We call the principles of eﬀective immune system design Scalable RADAR: Robust Adaptive Decentralized
Search and Automated Response. This paper explores how node diversity is maintained on a network that can
generate software variants at individual nodes and make local decisions about sharing variants between nodes. We
explore the eﬀects of diﬀerent network topologies on software diversity and resource trade-oﬀs. We examine how the
architecture of the lymphatic network balances trade-oﬀs between local and global search for pathogens in order to
improve our design. Experiments are performed on model networks of connected computers able to automatically
generate repairs to their own software in response to an attack, bug, or vulnerability. We ﬁnd that increased
connectivity leads to increased overhead, but decreased time to repair, and that small world networks more eﬃciently
distribute repairs. Diversity is diminished by increased connectivity, but has a more complex relationship with network
structure, for example, a highly connected network may exhibit low overall diversity but maintain high diversity in a
small number of low degree nodes in the periphery of the network.
Introduction
In the realm of cyber security the attacker currently has
the advantage. Defenders face a wide variety of con-
stantly adapting threats, but a great deal of software and
many operating systems are identical. Due to this mono-
culture, an attack that works against one computer will
work against many. Software monoculture also encour-
ages attackers by increasing attack scalability at no cost
to the attacker, e.g. Microsoft Windows is not necessar-
ily more vulnerable than other operating systems, but its
large market share makes it a preferred target.
Animal immune systems also face an onslaught of
diverse and adaptable attackers, yet eﬀectively defend
against disease and infection. Immune systems do so by
being adaptable, robust, scalable, and diverse. Diversity
is a valuable asset to a defender. Diversity prevents any
one attack from compromising a large portion of the
defender’s systems. The system of automated software
repair that we describe makes it possible to synthesize
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diversity and deploy software variants that will not be vul-
nerable to the same attacks, increasing diﬃculty and cost
for attackers.
We call the principles of eﬀective immune system design
Scalable RADAR: Robust Adaptive Decentralized Search
and Automated Response [1]. We seek to adapt these
principles to the realm of computer security and tilt the
balance of power in favor of the defender. Our goal is to
automatically identify security vulnerabilities and attacks
in software and repair them in real time at the very large
scales required by real computing systems.
In this paper we simulate the detection of malicious
inputs, repair of underlying bugs, and distribution of
repairs on a variety of network topologies. This is not a
model of how malware spreads, but rather we model how
computers on a network can distribute patches or repaired
variants of software in a fashion that does not require
top down control or manual intervention. In the current
implementation, the faults that need repaired are generic
and represent bugs, vulnerabilities, exploits, or any other
undesirable behavior, but the faults do not spread as
computer worms do.
We build our model to investigate several key questions:
What is the relationship between network topology and
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the speed with which nodes acquire immunity to attack?
How is network overhead, in terms of the amount of soft-
ware shared, related to the time to resist attack? Do some
networks balance the tradeoﬀ between software sharing
and time to resistance better than others? Does the diver-
sity of software in a network increase or decrease the time
for nodes to acquire resistance to new attacks? What is
the optimal level of diversity and how can it be maintained
without sacriﬁcing local response times?
We model diﬀerent network topologies including rings,
small world networks, a community structure network,
and a binary tree, and subject each network to the
same series of simulated “attacks”. We measure the time
between the start of each attack and the incorporation of a
repair (either generated locally or shared by a neighboring
node). We also measure the amount of overhead in terms
of the number of software variants shared between nodes,
and wemeasure the diversity of software on each network.
We hypothesize that networks with greater connec-
tivity and shorter mean path length will more rapidly
distribute repairs, but will decrease diversity in the pro-
cess. This may prove short-sighted if decreased diver-
sity makes it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd repairs to later
attacks.
Small world networks are found widely in nature [2,3],
but we hypothesize that networks with more isolated
components (such as a binary trees or rings) will likely
promote greater diversity in the same way that speciation
can occur when a subset of a population becomes isolated
from the rest of the population and is subjected to diﬀer-
ent ﬁtness criteria [4]. The binary tree and ring networks,
however, will take longer to acquire resistance as the lim-
ited information ﬂow will force nodes to spend more time
generating repairs locally.
Background and literature review
Principles from immunology
When faced with a deadly infection, the immune sys-
tem must rapidly ﬁnd and neutralize a small number of
pathogens hiding among trillions of healthy host cells
or the host dies. In [1] we propose a set of design
principles used by immune systems, ant colonies and
other complex biological systems. We identify mecha-
nisms that have evolved for Scalable Robust, Adaptive,
Decentralized Search and Automated Response (Scalable
RADAR). These properties are relevant to computer secu-
rity, where distributed, autonomous, rapid, robust and
adaptive control networks are required to defend against
increasingly sophisticated attacks. The immune system
has evolved lymphocytes (B and T cells) to adaptively
recognize and neutralize pathogens. Other immune cells
carry pathogens to lymph nodes where lymphocytes can
ﬁnd them. The architecture of the lymphatic network
that connects lymph nodes to each other and to tissue
facilitates the search for pathogens and production of
antibodies that neutralize them.
Immune system inspired approaches have been par-
ticularly successful in computer security (reviewed in
[5]) where immune inspired intrusion detection are dis-
tributed, scalable and sometimes robust to small failures,
but there has been little success in scalable automated
response. We identify design principles that lead to scal-
able RADAR in the immune system as a foundation for
developing architectures for computer security systems
that mimic the principles of scalable RADAR.
Immune systems are robust. Degeneracy (partial over-
lap in the functionality of multi-functional components)
and proportional response to threats both contribute to
robustness. Components are degenerate such that if one
cell dies, there are multiple similar cells to perform its
task with some degree of competency. Immune systems
are adaptive because populations of individuals change in
response to environmental signals. For example, activated
B cells produce a large and variable population of daugh-
ter B cells. Those that bind to pathogens most eﬀectively
reproduce faster, so the population of cells improves its
ability to neutralize the pathogen.
Search in the immune system is decentralized. No
cell tells the other cells what their task is, or when
or where they should do it. Cells sense chemical sig-
nals, environmental stimuli, and rates of interaction with
other immune cells to determine how, when and where
to search. While control of the search for pathogens is
completely decentralized, communication between indi-
viduals is aggregated spatially in lymph nodes that concen-
trate interactions between immune cells and pathogens
to improve the search process. Immune cells respond to
attacks by integrating local signals from their environment
to determine their behavior. Some local responses may be
‘errors’, but the response of the whole system is governed
by collective agreement.
Immune systems scale up to trillions of cells. Because
cells respond only to local signals, each can act in paral-
lel without need for information signals to travel to every
individual for a search to be eﬀective or a response to
be initiated. However, our analysis suggests that scalable
response requires more communication between individ-
uals as the system grows. We hypothesize that scalable
communication patterns are promoted by the physical
architecture of lymphatic networks. The immune system
balances the need for local detection of pathogens with a
systemic response to attack by distributing immune cells
across a semi-modular hierarchical system of lymph nodes
connected by the circulatory and lymphatic networks.
When we compare across animals from mice to horses,
the average size of a lymph node and the number of lymph
nodes both increase with animal size, but the increase
is sub-linear, so that a horse has more and larger lymph
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nodes than a mouse, but neither the increase in lymph
node size nor the increase in number are as great as the
increase in body size.
In this paper we draw from our understanding of these
scalable RADAR principles, and we focus on testing
which computer network architectures balance the need
to maintain diversity while rapidly responding to systemic
threats.
Patch distribution
Traditionally, patch distribution has been centralized and
hierarchical. System administrators are responsible for
pushing out patches to a network, or individuals are
prompted to begin the update process by notiﬁcations
which direct them to a site where the patch can be
downloaded. These distribution methods naturally lead
to problems as computer systems grow more complex.
According to [6], “manually applied patches are not eﬀec-
tive in countering worms because they require human
reactions and they are usually slow and do not scale well.”
Systems of any signiﬁcant size have automatic patching
and updating processes, but these systems still download
software from a central source. Additionally, diversity in
the code base is seen as a problem to be overcome rather
than a resource to be utilized. In [7], a system adminis-
trator laments “We have over 100 UNIX systems running
more than half a dozen UNIX based OSes (more than a
dozen when counting diﬀerent OS versions). ... all con-
ﬁgured slightly diﬀerently to suit their particular users’
needs. ... the majority of our days were spent merely
ﬁghting ﬁres.”
Most patch distribution and management research
focuses on timeliness, orderliness, and control. But all
these systems rely on manually generated repairs and
centralized distribution of patches overseen by a system
administrator. The ability to automatically generate and
evaluate repairs allows us to take a fresh perspective.
Automatically evolving software that resists attack
Genetic programming (GP) is a biologically-inspired
method of automatically creating or modifying software.
GP uses operations such as mutation and crossover to
evolve a population of software based on a user-deﬁned
ﬁtness function.
Forrest and Weimer use GP to evolve variants of pro-
grams that are resistant to security vulnerabilities [8-11].
Their design uses swap, copy, and delete operators on
program instructions in order to repair bugs while retain-
ing the original program’s required functionality. Both the
ﬁtness function and ‘required functionality’ are deﬁned
using test suites. Test suites are a common tool of software
engineers. Test suites consist of correct input/output pairs
that a program is expected to satisfy and are designed to
test software correctness.
Forrest and Weimer have recently investigated the ben-
eﬁts of “synthesizing diversity” by generating neutral soft-
ware variants. A software variant is said to be neutral
with respect to a suite of test cases if it passes all the
same test cases as the original program. Neutral software
variants have been shown to repair bugs experimentally
seeded into test programs [12]. When program variants
evolved by GP were evaluated on the tests that had been
removed from the original test suite, an average of 19
out of 5000 variants passed one or more of the tests. In
other words, the variants had repaired some of the seeded
bugs by chance. Based on these results, they introduce
the idea of mutational robustness, that lightweight ran-
dom changes to program code is relatively unlikely to
discernibly change program behavior.
Unspeciﬁed behavior may not be exercised by test cases
so mutations that aﬀect such behavior may still be consid-
ered neutral by the above deﬁnition of neutral. Suchmuta-
tions will only aﬀect “fringe” behavior that is commonly
exploited by malware. Neutral mutations can then be used
to synthesize diversity and proactively protect against
unknown bugs and novel attacks. “Normal” users may not
even know that the software they are using is diﬀerent
from the software used by the person in the neighboring
cubicle because the mutations are neutral with respect to
the standard program behavior. Rather than viewing neu-
tral mutants as an overhead to be avoided or an indication
of test suite inadequacy (e.g. [13,14]), we propose that they
enhance the evolutionary process and are useful in their
own right as a source of proactive diversity.
Given that GP can be used to automatically generate
software diversity, how should software be distributed so
as to maintain diversity? In this paper we investigate the
eﬀect on diversity of distributing variants on diﬀerent
network topologies.
We seek to replicate the scalability, robustness, and
adaptiveness of the natural immune system by mimicking
scalable RADAR principles. By analogy with the lymphatic
network, we focus on the design of the network that com-
puters use to share repairs. In our model, repairs are
shared locally among neighboring nodes instead of being
managed by a centralized, global controller.We investigate
network topologies that are conducive to RADAR prop-
erties. Our goal is to determine which network topologies
have the fastest response to newly discovered bugs or
exploits with the lowest overhead. To this end, we run
experiments on each network topology for a large and a
small network. Each experiment is run many times, sim-
ulating consecutive, increasingly problematic attacks, and
we measure overhead, time to resistance, and diversity.
Research design andmethodology
We ran two sets of six experiments on seven diﬀerent
network topologies. Networks were initialized with 1024
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nodes in one set of experiments and 64 nodes in the other.
Each experiment was run 100 times with diﬀerent random
seeds.
Each experiment consists of nine phases corresponding
to the nine increasingly severe attacks used (see Table 1).
At the beginning of each phase, every node is simultane-
ously subjected to the same attack. Each node that is not
resistant to the attack sends requests for software vari-
ants to all its neighbors. Vulnerable nodes also attempt to
generate their own repairs.
Nodes continue to generate software variants until a
resistant variant is found or is received from a neighbor.
Additional requests for variants are sent at regular inter-
vals (see Table 2 for the speciﬁc number of time steps for
intervals and actions).
Nodes respond to requests for variant software by trans-
mitting a copy of their own software to the requesting
node. Nodes always respond to requests for software vari-
ants regardless of whether or not they themselves are
vulnerable to the current attack. This is wasteful since vul-
nerable software will be useless to the receiver, but it is
only obviously wasteful because every node is subjected
to the same attack at the same time. In future work this
contrived attack pattern will be modiﬁed and nodes will
not know a priori whether or not their neighbors’ software
will be eﬀective.
The eﬀectiveness of received software variants is
not checked immediately upon receipt. Eﬀectiveness is
checked after the node has completed its current activ-
ity, such as generating its own repair. When a node that is
not yet resistant to the current attack identiﬁes a resistant
software variant, the node replaces its own software with
the variant. Incorporating a neighbor’s software decreases
diversity in the network, but the individual node no longer
needs to spend its own resources attempting to generate a













Attacks are values in the range zero to one. Any software with a resistance less
than the attack is considered vulnerable to the attack. The percentage of the
entire resistance space vulnerable to each attack is given below.
Table 2 Constants
Constant name Value Unit
Attack interval 50000 time steps
Software edge traversal time 100 time steps
Software request edge traversal time 100 time steps
Software incorporation time 1 time step
Repair attempt time 100 time steps
Random variants tested per repair attempt 10 software variants
Software request interval 300 time steps
Node count 1024 nodes
The model simulates parallelism by associating an update time with all objects
and incrementing update times by a speciﬁed amount when diﬀerent actions
are performed. Table 2 shows the time step penalties and other constants used
in the simulation. Any actions not listed, such as a node checking its own
vulnerability, incurs no delay. Attack interval is the number of time steps before
the next attack occurs. There was never a case of a node being vulnerable to the
previous attack when the next attack occurred.
Figure 1 shows a small ring network with three soft-
ware variants (represented by small envelopes) enroute to
neighboring nodes.
Each node on the network stores a 20-bit binary num-
ber used to represent the software that is attacked and,
in response, repaired and distributed by the nodes. The
nodes are initialized with identical, low-quality binary
numbers. We will refer to these binary numbers simply as
software or software variants.
The initial software is low-quality in the sense that it
is vulnerable to almost any attack. These “attacks” repre-
sent either external attacks (inﬁltration by a malicious or
unauthorized user), or bugs or vulnerabilities. They rep-
resent any sort of ﬂaw discovered in the software that can,
in principle be ﬁxed using the GP techniques of Forrest
and Weimer [11]. Each attack is a number in the range
zero to one, with zero being the least severe and one being
the most severe. In each experiment, the network is sub-
jected to increasingly severe attacks. As the attack gets
closer to one, fewer software variants exist that are resis-
tant. Table 1 shows the nine attack values used for all
experiments and the corresponding percentage of all pos-
sible values of 20-bit binary numbers that are vulnerable
to these attacks. Any software with a resistance less than
the attack is considered vulnerable.
A software variant (20-bit binary number), s, is con-




where (220) − 1 is the maximum value that can be repre-
sented in a 20-bit binary string.
Software is initialized to the binary string most closely
representing the value 0.547, which has one of the lowest
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Figure 1 A screenshot of the visualization of software variant sharing on a small ring network with each node connected to its nearest
neighbors. Software variants are represented by small envelopes. Three variants can be seen enroute. Nodes themselves are represented by
bisected rectangles. The salmon color represents the attack and becomes increasingly red as the experiment moves through the attack progression.
The other color in each rectangle is a unique color associated with each software variant. Values, colors, and resistances of these variants can be
seen in the table on the right side of the image.
possible resistances in the middle of the range zero to one.
init = ((220) − 1) · 0.547)
Resistance, r, for software with value, v, is calculated as
follows:
r = sin(16 · 2π · v) + 12
This sine function has 16 optima in the range zero to
one, a minimum y-value of zero, and a maximum y-value
of one.
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of an experiment using a
small number of nodes. The horizontal red line represents
the value of the current attack. Green dots are represen-
tations of software on diﬀerent nodes. The x coordinate
of the nodes is the software value, the y coordinate is the
resistance. The blue sine curve shows the resistance for
values in the range. The ﬁve green dots beneath the red
line show that ﬁve nodes are vulnerable to the current
attack.
“Repairs” are automatically generated by naively testing
random binary numbers for resistance against the current
attack. If software is generated which resists the attack,
then the node replaces its software with this new variant.
Each attempted repair consists of testing ten randomly
generated binary numbers.
The model simulates parallelism by associating an
update time with all objects. At each time step, every
object is checked to see if its update time is less than or
equal to the global time. If so, the object is updated. For
example, if node n has update time 100 and the current
time is greater than or equal to 100, then n will check to
see if it is vulnerable, check if any variants have been deliv-
ered from its neighbors, and, if enough time has passed
since its last request for software variants, send another
request. It takes one time step for a node to incorporate
a software variant, but 100 time steps to make ten repair
attempts. When a node makes these repair attempts,
its time will be incremented by 100. Nodes respond to
requests to share software without incurring any delay,
Figure 2 A snapshot of a dynamic graph showing nodes (green
dots) and where their “software” falls on the resistance
landscape (blue sine curve). As the attack (horizontal red line) rises,
nodes must keep their software above the red line in order to resist
the attack.
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but both requests and software variants take time to tra-
verse edges on the network. For more details, see Table 2.
Any actions not listed, such as a node checking its own
vulnerability incurs no delay.
Experiments were run on the following network topolo-
gies. All of these topologies were generated using the
NetworkX module for python [15]:
• Ring k=1 (R1): A ring in which each node is
connected to its two nearest neighbors (one on each
side). The 1024 node R1 network has 1024 edges. The
64 node network has 64 edges. The 1024 node




The connected Watts-Strogatz network forms a ring
and holds this form when the rewiring probability is
set to zero.
• Ring k=5 (R5): A ring in which each node is
connected to its ten nearest neighbors (ﬁve on each
side). The 1024 node R5 network has 5120 edges. The
64 node network has 320 edges.
networkx.connected watts strogatz
graph(1024, 10, 0.0)
• Small World Ring (SWR) aka NewmanWatts
Strogatz network: A ring where each node, u, has
three edges, one connected to each neighbor and one
random long range connection. Addition of the long
range edges turns the ring into a small world network
in which every node is connected to every other node
by a relatively short path. The 1024 node SWR




• Small World Ring Rewired k=5 (RR): A ring in which
nodes are connected to all their neighbors within a
radius of ﬁve nodes just like the R5 network. However,
RR is then ‘rewired’ such that edges are randomly
chosen to be removed and replaced with edges that
connects two nodes chosen uniformly at random.
This mirrors the approach taken by [2] to investigate
small world networks. Rewiring takes place as
follows: With 5% probability an arbitrary endpoint of
each edge is replaced with a node selected uniformly
at random. Rewiring probabilities in the range 1% to
10% produce networks with the lowest mean shortest
path with a minimum of long range connections [2].
networkx.connected watts strogatz
graph(1024, 10, 0.05)
Mean shortest path is calculated by taking the sum of
the lengths of the shortest paths between all pairs of
nodes in a network and dividing by the number of
pairs. It is a common measure of small world
networks, which are characterized by the small
number of edges in the path between any two nodes.
Small world networks have been popularized by the
“Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon” game in which players
try to connect an actor to Kevin Bacon through six or
fewer co-star connections.
• Small World Preferential Attachment (PA): A
random graph incrementally built up by preferential
attachment. New nodes connect to existing nodes
probabilistically, with greater weight given to existing
nodes that already have many connections. The 1024
node PA network has 1023 edges. It does not have
1024 edges because the network is initialized with two
nodes with one edge between them then 1022 nodes
are added and one edge is added to connect each of
the 1022 nodes. The 64 node network has 63 edges.
networkx.barabasi albert graph
(1024, 1023)
• Binary Tree (Bin): A hierarchical network, in the form
of a complete binary tree. The 1023 node Bin network
has 1022 edges. The 63 node network has 62 edges.
branching factor = 2
height = int(math.log(1024, 2))-1
networkx.balanced tree(branching
factor, height)
• Caveman Graph (Cave): A modular network
generated by making n cliques of size k. Then one
node in each clique is rewired to connect to an
adjacent clique. We generated caveman graphs with
16 cliques. Code for the caveman graph cannot be
found in the current version of NetworkX, but can be
accessed here [16].
cliques = 16
clique size = 1024 / cliques
networkx.connected caveman graph
(cliques, clique size)
For each experiment we measure the following:
• Prior Immunity: The chance that a node’s current
software is already resistant to a new attack. We
count the times a node is immediately resistant to a
new attack divided by the total number of new
attacks against all nodes.
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• Eﬀective Shared: The chance that a software variant
that node v receives from its neighbor resists the
attack against v. We count the number of eﬀective
variants received divided by the total number of
variants received. Only variants received while v is
vulnerable are counted. Variants received after
acquiring resistance are not counted towards the
numerator or denominator. By ignoring late variants
we will elevate the percentage of eﬀective shared
variants, but for this metric we are only interested in
variants shared during the vulnerable phase.
• Total Software Sharing: a count of instances of
software sharing between nodes over the course of
the entire experiment. For this metric, unlike
‘eﬀective shared’, we include software shared after the
destination node has already achieved resistance.
This metric measures network overhead.
• Average Time to Resistance: The average number of
time steps between the start of an attack on a node
and the node achieving resistance. This time could be
zero if a node has prior immunity. Since nodes
continually attempt to automatically generate repairs,
average time to resistance is also a measure of the
CPU overhead, the amount of CPU cycles a node
spends generating variants.
• Diversity: We measure diversity using the Shannon
Index




where S is the total number of distinct software
variants and pi is the probability that a node has
variant i. That is, pi equals the number of instances of
variant i divided by the total number of nodes.
Results and discussion
All ﬁgures and data reported below are for 1024 node
networks. The 64 node networks exhibited comparable
results.
Prior Immunity: The chance that a node will be resistant
to a novel attack is approximately 48% and was essentially
constant across all network topologies. This value was the
same whether there were 1024 or 64 nodes on the net-
work. This is not surprising since the quality of a software
variant is not evaluated along a continuum. It either is
vulnerable to the current attack or it isn’t. Even nodes on
networks with greater diversity had the same chance of
resisting novel attacks.
Total Software Sharing: The number of shared soft-
ware variants is greater in networks with more edges.
Figure 3 shows the total number of software variants
shared between nodes. R5, the ﬁve-neighborhood ring,
and RR, the rewired ring, have ﬁve times as many edges
Figure 3 The average number of software variants shared
during 100 iterations of each experiment for each network
topology. This is a measure of the network overhead, which we wish
to minimize. Software is shared when a neighboring node requests a
variant in response to an attack. Network topologies are ordered from
left to right by increasing number of edges. The data shown is for
1024 node networks. The caveman network is not shown because it
dwarfs the other columns. The caveman network shares about
250,000 software variants.
as the other networks (see Table 3). Consequently, they
share between four and ﬁve times as many variants over
the course of an experiment. The caveman network is not
shown because it dwarfs the other columns. The caveman
network has far more edges than any other network and
consequently shares around 250,000 software variants.
Figure 3 also indicates that over the course of the nine
attacks, on average eight to ten software variants are
shared across each edge on each network, hence the net-
work with 1024 edges shares about 10,000 variants and the
RSW network with 5120 edges shares about 45,000.
Average Time to Resistance: The software sharing over-
head should be viewed in the context of the time it takes
nodes on these networks to acquire resistance to new
attacks. Figure 4 shows that the network with the largest
amount of software sharing is also the quickest to resist
new attacks with Cave taking 6 steps on average. How-
ever, both PA and SWR buck the trend with low network
overhead and modest average time steps to resistance.
Eﬀective Shared: Figure 5 shows that the chance of
receiving an eﬀective variant depends on the network
topology. More eﬀective software variants are delivered
on the random preferential attachment network than on
any other, followed by the small world ring. One possi-
ble explanation for this eﬀect for the random preferential
attachment network is that few nodes in such networks
contain the majority of the edges. Such nodes would be
expected to quickly receive resistant software which they
could then rapidly distribute to their neighbors.
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Table 3 Network topologies
Topology Edges Nodes Considered “small world” Mean shortest path
Ring k=1 1024, 64 1024, 64 No 256.25, 16.25
Ring k=5 5120, 320 1024, 64 No 51.65, 3.66
Small World Ring 2048, 128 1024, 64 Yes 5.48, 3.11 *
Rewired Ring 5120, 320 1024, 64 Yes 5.27, 2.57 *
Preferential Attachment 1023, 63 1024, 64 Yes 2.00, 1.97 *
Binary Tree 1022, 62 1023, 63 No 14.07, 6.59
Caveman 32256, 96 1024, 64 No 9.00, 8.87 *
Two sets of experiments were run on six network topologies.
*denotes average values.
Diversity: Figure 6 shows the Shannon Index for each
topology after each attack. The index after initialization
is zero (not shown) because every node has the same
software. The distance-one neighbor ring (R1) maintains
the most diversity, which is easily explained by the rel-
ative diﬃculty with which any software variant would
spread across this network. After R1, the binary tree (Bin)
maintains the next highest diversity, suggesting that high
mean shortest path corresponds to high diversity, which
makes sense since longer path lengths limit the spread of
software variants.
The 64 node networks exhibited comparable results to
those reported above, not withstanding the dramatic dif-
ference in degree of the 64 node caveman network relative
Figure 4 Average number of time steps between novel attacks
and individual nodes’ resistance to these attacks. These numbers
are averaged over 100 iterations of each experiment for each network
topology. Since one set of attempted repairs takes 100 time steps,
this shows that on average no more than two sets of attempted
repairs are made before a repair is generated locally or a resistant
variant is received from a neighboring node. Network topologies are
ordered from left to right by increasing number of edges. The data
shown is for 1024 node networks.
to the other networks. The chance of prior immunity,
average time to resistance, and percentage of eﬀective
shared software was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between 64
and 1024 node networks with the same topologies.
Future work will look at more intelligent software shar-
ing paradigms. For example, nodes may simply ignore a
percentage of requests or we may use an economic model
such as the one for reducing the bandwidth overhead on
P2P networks introduced by [17]. Though far from the
only pertinent feature of peer-2-peer networks, the pref-
erential attachment network does have the same degree
distribution (power law). Likewise, the caveman graph has
a modular structure. Community structure is characteris-
tic of many networks found in the real world such as P2P
networks [18]. In future work, we will examine more real-
istic topologies with both community structure and power
law degree distributions.
Figure 5 Percentage of shared software variants that eﬀectively
resist the receiving node’s current attack. Only variants received
while the node was vulnerable were counted. Variants received too
late were not counted. Network topologies are ordered from left to
right by increasing number of edges. The data shown is for 1024
node networks.
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Figure 6 Average Shannon Index (a measure of diversity) over
100 iterations of each experiment for each network topology.
Topologies are ordered from left to right by increasing number of
edges. R1 stands for the ring network in which each node is
connected to its nearest neighbors. R5 stands for the ring network in
which each node is connected to its ﬁve nearest neighbors. SWR
stands for the small world ring with one random long-range
connection. RR stands for the rewired ring. PA stands for random
preferential attachment. Bin stands for binary tree. The data shown is
for 1024 node networks.
Wewill also add realism by replacing simulated bug ﬁxes
with actual repairs of bugs in open source C code. By
performing real repairs we can increase the realism in a
variety of ways, for example, the timing of variant sharing
can be based on the number of clock cycles elapsed while
generating the repair.
Conclusions
In this paper we simulate the detection of malicious
inputs, repair of underlying bugs, and distribution of
repairs on a variety of network topologies. We measure
the speed with which nodes acquired immunity to attack,
the overhead in terms of amount of software shared,
and the diversity of variants that emerge on the network
without any central control or distribution. We modeled
the following network topologies: rings, a Watts-Strogatz
small world network, a network formed by preferen-
tial attachment, a binary tree, and a so-called caveman
network.
The total number of software variants shared over the
course of an experiment directly corresponds to the num-
ber of edges in each network with eight to ten variants
shared over each edge. The networks with more edges
(R5, RR, Cave) show less sharing per edge. This may be
due to the fact that more software sharing speeds up
the acquisition of resistant variants, which stops nodes
from requesting additional variants and therefore reduces
software sharing. In short there is a negative feedback
mechanism involved in software sharing in response to an
attack.
The number of shared software variants for a given net-
work topology is inversely proportional to the average
time steps between a novel attack on a node and the node’s
resistance to the attack. In fact, Figure 3 is nearly the
mirror image of Figure 5. It’s interesting to note that the
random preferential attachment network’s average time to
resistance is slightly lower than that of R1 and Bin, despite
the fact that these graphs have the same number of edges
and similar amounts of software shared. This can perhaps
be explained by Figure 5, which shows that the chance
that a shared software variant resists the current attack is
highest on the preferential attachment network.
The fact that there is a diﬀerence in shared software
quality on the diﬀerent networks at all is surprising since
there was no diﬀerence in prior immunity. The struc-
ture of these networks makes it possible for them to
distribute resistant software more eﬀectively without ever
comparing software variants directly.
In the rings, R1 and R5, all nodes are created equally,
with the same degree and all positions in the networks
being equivalent. In all the other networks, except for
the binary tree, there is a wide range in node degree.
Nodes with higher degree will receive a larger number of
software variants in response to any request. These high
degree nodes may then distribute this software to all of
their neighbors, resulting in the increased eﬀectiveness
seen. Recall that ‘eﬀectiveness’ refers to the proportion of
shared variants that resist the current attack level.
Small world networks generated by preferential attach-
ment are characterized by robustness to the removal
of random nodes, but quickly become disconnected if
high degree nodes are removed. In other words, PA net-
works possess nodes with high “betweenness” through
which the majority of the information traﬃc must pass.
Betweenness is a measure of the probability of a node
lying on a randomly chosen shortest path between nodes.
In future work, we will investigate whether these high-
betweenness nodes are responsible for the increased per-
centage of eﬀective software sharing. Future experiments
will address this question by examining the relationship
between time to resistance and degree, distance to a highly
connected node, and distance to the root in the binary
tree. We will also look at the number of eﬀective variants
traveling up the binary tree (towards the root) versus the
number traveling down towards the leaves.
Diversity as measured by the Shannon Index is largely a
function of the mean shortest path of a network, but there
is more to it than that. The random preferential attach-
ment networks maintain high diversity as measured by
a raw count of distinct software variants (see Figure 7),
but have relatively low Shannon diversity, which also takes
into account the number of each variant present on the
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Figure 7 Diversity measured as a count of unique software
variants on the network. These counts were averaged over 100
iterations of each experiment for each network topology. The
preferential attachment (PA) network has a higher count of distinct
nodes relative to the other networks than would be expected based
on Figure 6.
network. This suggests that while PA networks are dom-
inated by relatively few variants, corners of the networks
maintain many unique variants. This is encouraging since
we believe that diversity can be leveraged for increased
robustness. It may be possible to implement diﬀerent soft-
ware sharing policies to encourage greater diversity on
this and other networks. We leave this for future work.
In the immune system, the structure of the lymphatic
network through which immune cells communicate is
critically important for scalable RADAR. The precise
topology of the lymphatic network is not known, but it
is known that the network enables both local and global
communication between lymph nodes, and as the number
of lymph nodes increases, each lymph node communi-
catesmore [1]. This is thought to balance the needs for fast
local search and systemic response. In this paper we have
analyzed network topologies to determine which topolo-
gies promote diversity and rapid patch distribution with
minimal overhead. In summary, overhead is proportional
to the number of edges, but inversely proportional to time
to resistance.
We ﬁnd encouraging evidence that some network
topologies allow eﬀective patches to be widely deployed
while still maintaining patch diversity. For example, eﬀec-
tive patches are easily shared among nodes in small
world networks. Furthermore, networks formed by ran-
dom preferential attachment have low software diversity,
but a high number of distinct software variants com-
pared to the other topologies. In other words, there is
low diversity in the majority of nodes, but high diversity
in a minority of nodes. We believe this to be due to the
ability of preferential attachment networks to distribute
variants rapidly through their high degree nodes, reduc-
ing Shannon diversity of the overall network, while diverse
nodes maintain a foothold in the low degree nodes at
the periphery of the network. This is a desirable feature
because if the majority of nodes are vulnerable to a new
attack, it is likely that these nodes can be “recolonized” by
a variant waiting in the wings. These results hold across
multiple orders of magnitude diﬀerence in network size
from 64 to 1024 nodes. Identifying the role of network
topology in maintaining diversity and rapid response is a
step toward developing more robust distributed computer
security systems that mimic the adaptive qualities of the
natural immune system.
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